The capitation payment to a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan for covering an individual between 2001 and 2005 is determined as the product of the benchmark rate and risk score. The benchmark rate is determined for each county-year, reflecting the county's past Medicare reimbursement costs. The benchmark rate for different counties in different years can be obtained from MA Ratebooks. 1 Although the same benchmark rate is applied for all individuals within a county-year pair, a risk score depends on an individual's demographic characteristics and the previous year's claims, which makes the eventual capitation payment individual-specific. Until 2000, the risk score was initially determined from the demographic model, which is based on an individual's gender, age, disability, Medicaid enrollment, and institutional status. The demographic model uses the data from traditional Medicare (TM) and predicts the TM cost based on those characteristics. Based on the predictability of health care cost by those conditions, the weight on each demographic variable is made and these aggregate to the risk score. During the 2000-2003 period, the CMS made 10 percent of a risk score dependent on inpatient claims data using the PIP-DCG risk adjustment model, while 90 percent of the risk score was still determined by the demographic model. The weights in the demographic model are publicly available, and the SAS program that calculates a risk score based on the PIP-DCG model is publicly available as well. 2 With this information, we can calculate the risk score for an individual in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), which has claims history from the previous year.
2006, and 2007, the HCC model was given the weights of 50 percent, 70 percent, and 100 percent, respectively, while the demographic model was given the remaining weights. The program that calculates the risk score based on the HCC model is also publicly available. 3 The program allows us to calculate a risk score for individuals that have TM claims information from the previous year is available.
One issue in calculating a risk score is that we do not have access to claims information for incumbent Medicare beneficiaries who enrolled in MA in the previous year. As a result, risk scores can be calculated only for individuals who enrolled in TM in the previous year. As discussed in Section II, we do not need to impute risk scores for relatively new Medicare beneficiaries who spent less than the full 12 months in the Medicare system in the previous year because their risk scores are determined only by demographic information. We impute risk scores with the PIP-DCG and HCC models for incumbent beneficiaries who enrolled in MA in the previous year using the estimated relationship between risk scores and detailed health and demographic information for those who enrolled in TM in the previous year. Because the MCBS provides such information for all individuals, we can use this information to impute risk scores for those who enrolled in MA in the previous year.
For the imputation, we run regressions of the risk scores of TM enrollees on 85 variables describing their detailed health and demographic information. Specifically, we run separate regressions for individuals depending on whether an individual lived in a nursing home at the time of the survey because different health information is available depending on nursing home status. 4 Eventually, we run four regressions for the imputation: two regressions for the risk score with the HCC model and two regressions for the risk score with the PIP-DCG model. Many variables included in the regression describe a history of illness and are also used as inputs for the calculation of the risk score. Examples of the variables include whether one has diabetes, whether one has ever had cancer in a specific part of the body, and whether one has ever had heart disease. With the regression estimates, we calculate the PIP-DCG and HCC risk scores for individuals who enrolled in MA in the previous year. Although this imputation might result in numbers that are different from the actual risk scores for MA enrollees, we provide suggestive evidence in Section II.B that the imputation results in reasonable risk scores.
With this imputation procedure, we have all MCBS individuals' risk scores with the PIP-DCG and HCC models. Then we calculate the final risk score for each individual by blending the risk scores from the demographic, PIP-DCG, and HCC models using the appropriate weights for a given year. Finally, we calculate each individual's capitation payment by multiplying the bench-
B. Calculating Predicted TM Reimbursement Cost
By definition, an individual's reimbursement cost for TM is only observed for those who enrolled in TM. Thus, we impute the predicted TM reimbursement cost for MA enrollees. First, using TM enrollees in the MCBS, we regress an observed claims cost on variables that are created as a function of three measures of health status included in the demand model as well as the county-level average TM cost. Second, we calculate predicted costs for the TM enrollees using the estimated coefficients reported in Table A2 . Finally, we calculate predicted costs for MA enrollees using the regression coefficient in the first step.
A caveat to the imputation of predicted TM costs for MA enrollees is that the regression might be potentially subject to selection bias because realized TM costs are observed conditional on the choice of TM. Because we control for many health measures including the HCC score, which is based on past insurance claims, we believe that there is likely to be a limited role for unobserved heterogeneity that affects both health care costs and the choice of TM over MA. Moreover, even if selection into MA based on unobserved characteristics exists, we expect that our results in Section III will be not qualitatively affected by the selection. Specifically, because observably healthy individuals select into MA plans, it is natural to expect that unobservably healthy individuals also select into MA plans as well. In this case, we overestimate the predicted cost of MA enrollees. We, therefore, need to adjust that the health care cost of MA enrollees is lower than the health care cost of TM enrollees with the same observed characteristics. In Section III, we show regression results where we discount the predicted costs of MA enrollees by introducing w ∈ [0, 1]. We show that the main results are robust in Table 4 with respect to w. Moreover, our estimation of demand-side parameters does not depend on predicted TM costs but on direct health measures such as Phy/Cog, V/H, and HCC score. Thus, our main finding that advertising attracts healthy individuals does not depend on predicted TM costs. Thus, we believe that the omission of the selections will not have much of an impact for our main conclusion.
C. Direct Mail Advertising
This section provides a supplemental analysis using data on direct mail advertising. Although we find evidence that mass advertising is targeted to DMAs with higher potential profits from risk selection, insurers may further implement sophisticated targeting within a DMA. To pursue this possibility, we investigate the second measure of advertising: direct mail advertising. We believe that direct mailings are a very useful tool from an insurer's perspective for targeting its advertising A-3 toward an individual with certain characteristics. Presumably, insurers often have access to the demographic characteristics of individuals who live at specific addresses or have access to information about the average demographic in a small geographic area such as zip code. Therefore, they may utilize sophisticated targeting to attract less costly customers. By using this data set, we can gain insights into which individuals are more likely to receive advertising.
The data set is from Mintel Comperemedia (Mintel henceforth), which is a database that tracks direct mail advertising in the United States. Each month, the database collects direct mailings from nationally representative households throughout the United States. These households are asked to collect and return mailings in the eight sectors monitored by Mintel, which include health insurance. The Mintel data contain information on each mailing such as the advertiser and product name, which allows us to tell whether a mailing is advertising an MA plan. Moreover, the data also provide information about the demographic characteristics of the recipient of each mailing, such as ages of household heads, household income, zip code, and so on. Based on the income measure provided in the Mintel data, we also created a new income variable using the five categories that were used to create a new income variable for individuals in the MCBS. For our analysis, we excluded individuals from counties where no MA insurer is available. Moreover, we selected households with at least one household head who is at least 64. 5 Table A28 presents summary statistics from Mintel. In this data set, the unit of observation is an individual-month pair, meaning that an individual received 0.158 mailings per month from MA plans on average. Conditional on receiving at least one MA-related mailing, an individual received 1.24 mailings per month on average. We find that those who received mailings tend to have lower household income and also reside in neighborhoods with lower average income (measured by zip code level). 6 Those who received mailings tend to be older than those who did not. Moreover, individuals in markets with more Medicare beneficiaries are more likely to receive mailings.
Summary Statistics

Evidence on Targeting and Its Impact on Demand
We study whether advertising is targeted and whether target advertising increases demand. We first investigate whether the targeting of direct mailings responded to the introduction of the comprehensive risk adjustment in 2004. Our hypothesis is that as it is more profitable to attract unhealthy individuals (in terms of risk score), insurers may want to attract relatively unhealthy individuals starting in 2004. One limitation of the Mintel data is that we do not observe health-related measures for individuals. Thus, we use a household's income as a proxy for the risk scores of the household's heads, which is motivated by the fact that an individual's health and income are highly positively correlated, as shown in Table A29 .
A caveat to the hypothesis is that the risk adjustment policies may give insurers incentive to implement more sophisticated risk selection. For example, Brown et al. (2014) argue that enrolling Hispanics with higher risk scores will be much more profitable after the risk adjustment policy because Hispanics tend not to utilize health care compared with other races with the same health conditions and because a higher risk score will lead to a greater capitation payment after the risk adjustment policy. At least in the context of this example, however, insurers would like to target low-income individuals because Hispanics tend to have lower incomes in our data sample. Of course, the sophisticated targeting can be implemented in different ways. However, we believe that insurers may have access to information only related to income and demographics of each household. Thus, it is in general hard for them to know where to find individuals with specific health statuses, unless they were already a member of that insurance company's plan.
We use two different measures for income. In the first specification, we use an individual's income reported in the Mintel data, which is a categorical variable with five categories as mentioned before. In the second specification, we use the average income in an individual's zip code.
With the first specification, we run the following regression:
where y it is the number of MA-related direct mailings that household i received in a particular month-year t, I it is a categorical variable for a household income measure, which takes a higher value if an income is higher, and 1[I it = k] is a dummy variable that is equal to one if I it is equal to k. As mentioned earlier, I it has five categories from one to five, with a higher number assigned for a greater income. In equation (A1), we normalize coefficients for the highest income to zero -that is, α 1,5 = α 2,5 = 0. Similarly, 1[t ≥ Oct, 2003] is a dummy variable that is equal to one for a time in or after October 2003. We chose the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2003 as the time when the new risk adjustment regime starts to affect an MA insurer's targeting. Because its implementation was announced in March 2003, MA insurers likely adjusted their targeting even before the beginning of 2004. Moreover, X it is a vector of other characteristics of a household i, including whether there is a male or female household head, ages of male and female household heads if they exist, potential average profit defined as the capitation benchmark minus the feefor-service cost for each county-year, number of Medicare beneficiaries in each county-year, and median household income for each county-year. Next, f t represents the fixed effects for month-A-5 year t. In addition, f c represents the county fixed effect for a combination of households. Finally, f mt represents the fixed effect for each DMA-year pair (mt).
In equation (A1), our main coefficients of interest are α 2,k for k = 1, · · · , 4. This measures how the change in risk adjustment in 2004 affected an insurer's incentives to target households with different incomes, relative to the pre-2004 period. Because α 2,5 = 0 by normalization, coefficient α 2,k for k = 1, · · · , 4 measures how many mailings a household whose I it is equal to k received, compared with a household whose I it is equal to 5 (i.e., the highest income category group) after the new risk adjustment regime. Note that because of the county fixed effect included in the regression, we are not relying on a cross-county variation, meaning that identification of α 2k does not come from cross-county variation in potential profits. Instead, the identification uses withincounty variation in incentives to target different individuals before and after the policy change. Moreover, the DMA×year fixed effect absorbs any variation in annual mass advertising, which varies at the DMA-year level. Thus, our specification controls for potential coordination between direct-mail and mass advertising at least at the annual level.
A legitimate concern about using household income as a proxy for health risk is that income may be correlated with other unobserved heterogeneity that can have an impact on a household's medical expenditures. This is important because an insurer's profit will eventually depend on medical expenditures instead of health status itself. For example, an individual with a higher income may have a higher willingness to pay for medical care, which may result in a greater medical expenditure. Therefore, coefficient estimates α 1,k for k = 1, · · · , 4 will not provide good information about whether MA insurers target healthy individuals. However, we are interested in relative changes in targeting induced by the policy change, which are captured by α 2k . As long as the relationship between the unobserved heterogeneity and income does not change at the time when the new risk adjustment design was introduced, the concern will not apply to α 2k .
With the second specification, we estimate the following equation:
where I zip(i),t represents the average income in the zip code of individual i's address at time t. Here, the coefficient of interest is α 1,zip . The concern about the unobserved heterogeneity applies to this specification as well and can be addressed with the same argument put forth in the previous paragraph.
The results are summarized in columns (1) and (2) in Table A30 , which present the results with household income and zip-code income, respectively. The results show that lower-income households are more likely to receive advertising after the new risk adjustment regime in both specifications. In the first specification, we find that the number of mailings will increase the most under the new regime for households with incomes that are not too low or too high, which is consistent with the previous finding that it is still unprofitable to enroll individuals with very high risk scores. When a zip-code income is used, we find that insurers tend to send more mailings to lower-income neighborhoods under the new regime. Because the unit of a zip-code-level income is $1,000, the estimate with the specification with a zip-code income suggests that a one standard deviation increase in a zip-code-level income ($28,000) leads to a 0.018 decrease in the number of monthly mailings from MA insurers, which is about 10 percent of the unconditional mean of the number of monthly mailings. Moreover, we do not find any statistically significant patterns in targeting before the new regime in either specification.
Although we find that insurers target individuals with different characteristics after the new regime, it does not necessarily mean that an individual's demand for MA responded to the different targeting. Because the Mintel data do not provide any information about an individual's insurance choice, we cannot directly test whether the change in the targeting of direct mailings led to a consistent change in demand for MA. Instead, we test the hypothesis indirectly using the MCBS. Specifically, we investigate whether an individual, with characteristics targeted by MA insurers, is (i) more likely to switch to MA if the individual did not choose MA in the previous year or (ii) more likely to switch to a different MA insurer if the individual chose an MA insurer in the previous year. 7 Now we define y it to be a dummy variable that equals one if condition (i) or (ii) is met. We run regressions similar to equations (A1) and (A2). Specifications (3) and (4) in Table A30 present results from the two regressions. Note that none of the estimated coefficients for the interactions between incomes and the new risk adjustment regime are positive. This result implies that direct mail was not very effective in inducing consumers to enroll in MA, at least for the years considered in our analysis.
The insignificant impact of direct mail advertising on demand may partly result from firms' difficulties in accessing the true impact of targeted advertising on demands. Findings in recent research on advertising, such as Blake et al. (2015) , suggest that advertisers might not know the effectiveness of their sophisticated targeting strategy, which may lead to a suboptimal advertising strategy. Thus, although MA insurers targeted the lower-income group after the risk adjustment, it is still possible that demand responses to targeted advertising are small.
It is still possible, however, that we have this result on direct mail advertising because the data for health insurance choices and the data for direct mail are obtained from different sources. With this data situation, it is difficult to accurately estimate the effect of direct mailing on the demand for MA. Therefore, we only view this evidence as suggestive. As a robustness check, we first implement an IV approach to estimate the common effect of advertisingα 0 . As IVs, we use the Hausman-Nevo IV (Hausman, 1996 , Nevo, 2001 ) and the profitability of risk selection constructed in Section III. We construct the Hausman-Nevo IV as the average advertising expenditures in DMAs located in the different states by the same parent company in the same year. As in the main specification, we include insurer×county fixed effects and year fixed effects. The IV can be correlated with advertising in a market through several channels. First, it likely captures the common component in the cost of advertising for insurers under the same parent company. Second, it may also capture a risk selection channel. If the gain from risk selection is very different across markets, advertising in a market can be negatively correlated with advertising in other markets because advertising will be targeted to markets with greater profits from risk selection. If the gains are similar across markets, the correlation can be positive.
Because we include insurer×county fixed effects, the main identification assumption is that changes in the IV over time is uncorrelated with ∆ξ jct . The IV may change over time because of supply-side factors such as a change in a common component in an insurer's cost of advertising or a change in the profitability of risk selection driven by risk adjustment policies. One caveat is that there may still be time-varying unobserved qualities that are correlated across markets, which may be also correlated with changes in the IV over time. By excluding advertising in DMAs in the same state in constructing the IV, we can at least address a concern about a possible correlation between unobserved qualities within a state.
Moreover, we also experiment with adding the profitability of risk selection as an additional IV (rspro f 1 mt in equation (4)), which reflects the effects of the risk adjustment on incentives for risk selection. Because the variable may be correlated with average profitability, we also experiment with removing variation in rspro f 1 mt that is correlated with the average profitability measure (avpro f mt in equation (3)). 8 The identifying assumption is that an insurer's unobserved quality does not respond to changes in the profitability from risk selection. Thus, the validity of the identification assumption depends on how much we control for insurer's other potential risk selection tools that are time varying. Although it is not perfect, we believe that our approach to include an extensive list of plan characteristics in the demand model addresses this issue to some extent.
We report the IV first stage estimates in Table A9 in the Online Appendix and our estimates of the common effect of advertising (α 0 ) based on the IV strategy in Table A8 . We find that the first
The Border Identification Strategy
As an additional robustness check for estimating the common effect of advertising, we also employ a border identification strategy. Our border identification strategy utilizes a discontinuity of advertising expenditures by the same insurer across a border between DMAs by comparing mean utilities for the same insurer in contiguous counties located on opposite sides of a DMA border. This identification strategy follows the recent marketing literature (Shapiro, 2016; Tuchman, 2016; Moshary, 2017) , and the main idea behind this type of border approach is already seen in a seminal work by Holmes (1998) . A DMA typically contains a major city and surrounding counties. Thus, there are "border counties" in an outer part of a DMA that are located right next to at least one county in a different DMA. In contrast, "non-border counties" are surrounded only by counties belonging to the same DMA. With this identification strategy, we compare mean utilities of the same insurer only in border counties on the opposite sides of a DMA border. The unobserved quality of plans offered by the same insurer is likely to be similar, but consumers might be exposed to different amounts of advertising by the same insurer because they happen to live in different DMAs.
For insurers in border counties, we specify ξ jct in equation (7) in the following way:
where b(c) refers to a DMA border to which county c belongs. For example, if a border between DMA m 1 and DMA m 2 is called b 12 , then b(c) = b 12 for any border counties c belonging to either m 1 or m 2 . The first term ξ jb(c)t refers to an insurer×border×year fixed effect that would capture insurer j's unobserved characteristics in year t that are common to insurer j's plans in all counties that share border b(c). The second term ξ jc is an insurer×county fixed effect that captures systemic time-invariant differences in demand for insurer j in different counties within b(c). Lastly, ∆ξ jct is the remaining unobserved characteristic, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with ln 1 + ad jm(c)t . With this specification of ξ jct , the identifying assumption is similar to that in a difference-in-difference regression. The identifying assumption is that unobserved differential trends of mean utilities for the same insurer (∆ξ jct ) are uncorrelated with trends of advertising spending by the insurer in different DMAs along border b.
The validity of the identifying assumption hinges on how much these fixed effects control for time-varying unobserved characteristics. Although it is difficult to directly verify a violation of the identifying assumption, we can still verify whether an insurer's plans on the opposite sides of a A-9 border are systemically different from each other with respect to their observed characteristics. If plans from the same insurer are very different across a border, then it is likely that their unobserved characteristics are very different as well. In Table A25 , we compare characteristics of plans and county characteristics in border counties on the opposite sides of a border between DMAs. The table is created in the following way. For each insurer-border-year, all plans in the DMA where the insurer spends less on advertising are put under Group 1, and all plans in the other DMA where the insurer spends more on advertising are put in Group 2. Of course, advertising spending is different between the first and second columns by construction. The T-test shows that most characteristics on either side of a border are not statistically different. However, counties with more advertising tend to have average TM costs and average TM costs net of capitation benchmark.
One thing to note from Table A25 is that there is little variation of premiums across DMA borders. However, it does not imply that advertising has little impacts on an insurer's pricing. An insurer's pricing would typically depend on the expected costs of providing insurance, which are affected by (a) the insurer's risk pool, which may be affected by advertising; and (b) other determinants of health care cost (e.g., regional health care costs). As reported in Table A25 , we find that, health care costs, measured in terms of county-level average TM costs, tend to be higher in counties in DMAs with higher advertising spending compared with neighboring counties in other DMAs with lower advertising spending. County benchmarks of capitation payments in these counties do not completely compensate for higher costs. We find that this cost difference is not explained by regional differences in the distribution of health statuses because Table A26 shows that realized TM reimbursement costs are greater for border counties with more advertising conditional on health status. Thus, the variation in average TM costs across DMA borders reflects regional differences in health care costs at least in this context. Advertising and health care costs will have opposite impacts on premiums: (a) higher advertising spending will lead to better risk pools and lower premiums; and (b) higher health care costs will lead to higher premiums. Thus, the fact that premiums are similar across DMA borders does not imply that advertising has no impact on premiums. 9 ' 10 Finally, we would like to mention limitations with the border strategy. First, identification is only coming from local variation in advertising and market shares -that is, we do not use variation in non-border counties. Thus, one needs to use caution when extrapolating the coefficient estimates to non-border counties. Table A27 shows that market characteristics in border and non-border counties are different to some degree, such as the number of insurers, MA penetration rates, and county benchmark. Second, it is still possible that consumers living in border counties may be exposed to very similar amounts of advertising because they may make a trip to the opposite side of the border. This may weaken the sharp discontinuity of advertising expenditures across a DMA border. Lastly, if regional health care costs affects unobserved characteristics, then the border approach will lead to a biased estimate because regional health costs are different across the border as we discussed above.
Our estimation result is reported in Table A8 . We find that the border strategy results in an estimate that is very similar to estimates from other approaches.
E. Diagnosis to Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) Critique
Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) find that parameter estimates may converge to a local minimum or saddle points in random-coefficients demand systems. To make sure that our estimates are not stuck at such points, we did the following. First, for the contraction mapping process, we used a strict tolerance criterion of 1e −14 , which is much stricter than the level used in some papers estimating random-coefficient demand models. For example, Berry et al. (1995) use a tolerance of 1e −4 . Second, we experimented with different starting values for the nonlinear optimization and find that convergence occurs at a similar value. Third, we also experimented with a derivativefree optimization algorithm and find that convergence occurs at a similar value to our baseline estimates, for which we used an algorithm that uses derivatives.
F. Details on the Supply Side 1. Characterization of Optimal Pricing and Estimation
For the optimal pricing for plans of insurer j in market ct, the first-order conditions for the optimal premiums for the plans given by equation (10) can be rewritten in a matrix form as follows:
A-11 where
. . .
Equation (A4) can rewritten by dividing both sides by dQ jct :
Note that the left-hand side of equation (A5) can be calculated using the estimated demand model. The right-hand-side variables can also be calculated up to parameter ω ω ω and error term H jct . Therefore, parameter ω ω ω can be estimated using equation (A5).
One challenge in estimating ω ω ω is that elements of dQ −1 jct dFFS jct are endogenous to elements of H jct . Each element of matrix dQ −1 jct dFFS jct measures the expected health care cost of a marginal consumer of each plan. Moreover, each element of H jct is an insurer-plan-county-year-specific shock to the marginal cost defined in equation (11), η jlct . The marginal cost shock η jlct will affect insurer j's pricing and advertising decisions. As a result, η jlct will affect the average health status of a marginal consumer to the extent that a premium and advertising expenditure have differential effects on the demand of consumers with different health statuses. In fact, we find that advertising has such effects, as reported in Section VI.
We solve the endogeneity problem with an instrumental variable. We use the average reimbursement cost in TM in county c and year t (T MC ct ) as an instrument. The main idea is that T MC ct is correlated with the predicted TM reimbursement cost FFS ct (h it ), a component of dQ −1 jct dFFS jct , because overall health care costs in county c in year t will affect both T MC ct and FFS ct (h it ). The A-12 main identification assumption is that T MC ct is not correlated with η jlct for all j and l, conditional on all control variables in equation (A5). Because we include an extensive list of insurance product variables as well as the measurement of health care costs, the residual marginal cost is likely to capture insurer-specific administrative costs, which are less likely to correlate with TM reimbursement costs. Estimates of ω are reported in Table A20 .
G. Discussion about Upcoding
One potential issue in dealing with risk scores for MA enrollees is MA insurers' upcoding of diagnoses, which artificially increases risk scores. In fact, Geruso and Layton (2015) find evidence that MA insurers upcode diagnostic codes to increase capitation payments for their enrollees. When we construct imputed HCC scores for those who enrolled in MA in the previous year, we do not adjust the imputed HCC scores for the possibility that their risk scores may be affected by an insurer's upcoding. Although we showed that our imputed HCC scores look reasonable, it is important to acknowledge how our analysis may be affected by not incorporating upcoding. Below, we discuss that, at least in our analysis, a potential bias in our results will be very limited and will not alter our main conclusion.
Preliminary Analysis of Targeted Advertising
In our preliminary analysis in Section III, we construct a measure of the profitability of risk selection (rspro f mt ) using the individual-level capitation payment, which is a function of the HCC score. Thus, it is possible that the lack of incorporating potential upcoding might lead to measurement errors for rspro f mt .
Note that upcoding will not always lead to measurement errors. Suppose that upcoding affects the HCC scores of healthy and unhealthy individuals by similar amounts. Then, there will not be any effects on rspro f mt because rspro f mt is the standard deviation of potential profits across individuals with different health statuses.
However, upcoding might increase the HCC scores of certain individuals more than other individuals. Because upcoding can occur when an enrollee visits a physician, upcoding is presumably more likely for unhealthy individuals who would see their physicians more frequently than healthy individuals. In this case, our measure of rspro f mt is likely greater than an actual rspro f mt from an MA insurer's perspective because upcoding will increase potential profits from unhealthy individuals more than those from healthy individuals. Even in this case, if the magnitude of the measure error for rspro f mt is uniform across DMAs in a given year, then the measurement error will not affect the estimate of the coefficient for rspro f mt -β 2 in equation (2) -because of the year fixed effect in the regression.
The estimate of β 2 will be biased if the measurement error for rspro f mt is larger for certain A-13
DMAs in certain years than other DMA-year pairs. We will argue that the coefficient β 2 will be underestimated in a likely scenario. We expect that if magnitudes of the error are different across DMAs, then those with higher health care costs are more likely to have greater measurement errors. Because a capitation payment is a product of a benchmark rate and the HCC score, and because the benchmark rate is usually greater in a region with higher health care costs, even the identical increases in HCC scores induced by upcoding in different DMAs will result in a greater increase in a capitation payment in a DMA with a high cost. In this case, we expect that our measure of rspro f mt in the data will overstate the actual rspro f mt from the insurer's perspective to a greater degree in DMAs with higher costs than other DMAs. In other words, rspro f mt (data) − rspro f mt (actual) is greater in the former DMAs than in the latter DMAs. This is because upcoding will likely increase profits from unhealthy individuals more than profits from healthy individuals, which will reduce the dispersion of profits from different health statuses. Moreover, these measurement errors are likely to be greater in the years after the comprehensive risk adjustment because upcoding is possible when risk scores are calculated based on diagnostic codes. Here, recall that differential changes in rspro f mt across DMAs over time are the identifying variation for the coefficient β 2 . As shown in Table A4 , the risk adjustment decreased our measures of rspro f mt to a larger degree in DMAs with high health care costs compared with other DMAs. If our measures of rspro f mt in the data overstate the actual rspro f mt more in the former DMAs after the risk adjustment, then the risk adjustment will decrease rspro f mt even more in the former DMAs from the insurer's perspective than those in the latter DMAs. In other words, the data variation in rspro f mt will be smaller than the actual variation in rspro f mt from the insurer's perspective, which will lead to underestimation of the coefficient β 2 .
Counterfactual Analysis An insurer's profit function in equation (8) depends on capitation payments from those who enrolled in MA in the previous year, for whom insurers will be able to engage in upcoding. Upcoding will potentially increase an insurer's profit from these individuals, but we do not explicitly incorporate the possibility in our framework. However, we believe that our main conclusion from the counterfactual analysis is not likely to change. Note that those who enrolled in MA in the previous year are not likely to respond very much to a change in pricing or advertising because of the switching cost. An insurer's optimal pricing and advertising depend on the behaviors of marginal consumers, who are likely to consist of new-to-Medicare individuals that do not face the switching cost. Moreover, insurers cannot upcode these individuals' risk scores because they only depend on demographic factors. Thus, the effect of upcoding on the revenue from the marginal consumer will be limited, which in turn implies that upcoding would have only limited impacts on our counterfactual results.
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H. Details about the Counterfactual Experiments with Better Risk Adjustment Systems
Here, we provide details about the counterfactual experiments with better risk adjustment systems in Section VII.C. As mentioned in that section, we conduct this counterfactual to qualitatively illustrate the impacts of alternative risk adjustment systems on an insurer's behavior. For this counterfactual, we specify the functional form of the cost function of advertising as
where FC jmt is the fixed cost of advertising, which is included to rationalize the significant fraction of insurers without advertising, and ζ jmt is the parameter that captures a potential heterogeneous marginal cost of advertising across insurers.
We use Nash equilibrium conditions for the optimal pricing and advertising to estimate parameters in the supply-side model. The optimality conditions for the pricing remain the same as in equation (10). The necessary conditions for the optimal advertising level ad * jmt for each insurer are as follows:
jmt ) for any p jmt , any ad * jmt ≥ 0 and any ad jmt ≥ 0, where p * jmt is a vector of equilibrium premiums for all of insurer j's plans in DMA m in year t, which satisfy the first-order condition in equation (10). Note that the fixed cost of advertising results in the inequality condition. In order to avoid the complication of dealing with the inequality condition, we consider a counterfactual experiment where only insurers with positive baseline advertising reoptimize advertising levels to other interior points, which are determined by equation (A7). The impact of this restriction should be negligible in our counterfactual that introduces a better risk adjustment system, which leads insurers to reduce advertising. Moreover, we only consider a marginal change in risk adjustment because a drastic change would make the role of the fixed cost of advertising more important. With this assumption, we only need to recover ζ jmt using the first-order condition in equation (A7). A-18 (1), (3), and (5) present results with specifications, where avpro f mt , rspro f 1 mt , and rspro f 2 mt are calculated by pooling together potential profits from individuals in years before the risk adjustment and pooling together the profits in years after the risk adjustment. Columns (2), (4), and (6) A-19 to all plans offered by the insurer that the MA enrollee chose and then calculate summary statistics of the plan characteristics. The first column, labeled "Levels," presents summary statistics of the plan characteristics. The second column, "Deviations," presents summary statistics of a plan-level deviation from the average value of each characteristic within each insurer chosen by each MA enrollee. Because we condition on ξ jct in equation (5), variation in these deviations would identify the parameters for plan characteristics. Note that the mean of each characteristics under "Deviations" is equal to zero by construction.
I. Supplemental Tables
A-20 (1) presents estimates with the specification, where we deal with the endogeneity of advertising with firm and county fixed effects. Column (2) presents estimates with the main specification, where we deal the endogeneity of advertising with firm-county fixed effects. Column (3) presents the IV regression with the Hausman-Nevo IV only. Column (4) presents the IV regression with the Hausman-Nevo IV as well as the profitability from risk selection as an IV (rspro f 1 mt in equation (4)). Column (5) presents the IV regression with the Hausman-Nevo IV as well as rspro f 1 mt without variation correlated with the average profitability (avpro f mt in equation (3)). Column (6) presents the border identification strategy. In addition, all specifications include the following set of variables as control variables: year fixed effects, dummy variables for the number of plans offered by an insurer in the model; dummy variables for the number of plans offered by an insurer in the original data. Note that last two variables are not identical because we aggregate original plans up to construct four different types of plans offered by an insurer in the model, as explained in Section II. The first stage regression for the instruments in Columns (3), (4), and (5) are reported in Table A9 . For an insurer in year t, Hausman-Nevo for year t is equal to the insurer's parent company's average advertising in DMAs outside the insurer's own state in year t. For an insurer in an year other than t, the variable is equal to zero. Thus, the coefficients for Hausman-Nevo IV are year specific. This specification follows Nevo (2001) and allows for a flexible correlation between the IV and the main endogenous variable (i.e. advertising). Columns (1) to (3) present the first-stage results for the regression specifications in columns (3) to (5) in Table A8 . In the first-stage regressions, we also include the same set of control variables as in specifications in columns (3) to (5) in Table A8. A-22 A-23 A-24 The common effect for the dummy variable for Private-Fee-For-Service plans is absorbed by the fixed effects included in the estimating equation (7). Standard errors are in parentheses.
A-25 A-26 A-28 A-29 A-31 Industry profit per capita is defined as the sum of annual profits across all plans in a county divided by the number of Medicare beneficiaries (not MA enrollees) in the county. Reported numbers are the averages of industry profit per capita conditional on whether an insurer did any advertising and whether the insurer belonged to "Market w/ Small Ad" or "Market w/ Large Ad."
A-32 A-33 A-34 (3) and (4). All specifications include other control variables discussed in C.
A-36 
